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Abstract 
Key corporate stakeholders in Zimbabwe contest the directors' remuneration and incentive systems. The study 
sought to find out if directors’ remuneration is aligned to corporate performance as reflected by corporate share 
prices. Secondary data was gathered from detailed annual reports of the companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange whose directors’ remuneration data information could be accessed. Samples of nine companies in 
2009 and thirteen companies in 2010 were used. Correlation Coefficients, Regression Analysis, Chi Square Tests 
and Averages were used to analyse data for discussion. Results indicated a weakening positive correlation 
between directors’ remuneration and corporate performance over the two years. The research concluded that 
Directors’ remuneration in Zimbabwe is not linked to corporate performance and that good corporate governance 
is lacking in most of these companies as suggested by the dearth of information on directors’ remuneration. The 
research recommended the central determination of directors’ remuneration based on agreed corporate 
performance measures / indicators. Individual directors’ fees need to be disclosed in the ZSE Handbooks. 
Further research with an increased sample size is encouraged. 
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1. Introduction and Background of the Research Problem 
A study by Gregg et al (1992) in the United Kingdom noted that the growth rate of directors' remuneration was 
extra high and weakly linked to corporate performance. The claims that executive incentives are not aligned to 
corporate performance in Zimbabwe are common in both public and private institutions. The Herald (13 March 
2012) reported that a team appointed by the Government to revive Chitungwiza Municipality was reportedly 
costing council thousands of dollars in salaries and allowances. This abuse of office by claiming exorbitant and 
unsustainable allowances by the resuscitation team triggered threats of industrial action by workers who had 
gone for months without pay. In The Herald (13 March 2012), workers alleged that a member of that team was 
getting US$26 525 in salaries and allowances per month. The chairperson of the team was allegedly getting 
US$4 175 in allowances after every ten days and council was also allegedly forking out US$2 000 weekly for his 
hotel bills. He reportedly got US$1 000 for other necessities as part of the allowances and one hundred litres of 
fuel weekly. The paper alleged that the allowances were higher than what the minister directed on their 
appointment. In the Herald (13 March 2012), the minister was quoted as saying, “Following the appointment of 
the resuscitation team effective 27 January 2012 for a period of three months, I hereby direct council to pay the 
following fees to the resuscitation team on monthly basis until expiry of their term of office — chairperson 
(US$12 000), …..”  
Petra et al (2007) noted that there has been an increasing gap between CEO compensation and average employee 
wages, where as Gregg et al (1992) observed a disappearing relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
corporate performance.  
Such directors’ compensation debates have not spared Zimbabwe. Studies by Dandira (2011), noted that 
investigations done by the Labour and Economic Development Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) revealed that 
most company CEOs are taking home salaries which are above US$15000 per month in addition to other perks 
which include children's education allowances of US$2500 per child per term for a maximum of three (3) 
children, cell phone allowances of US$500 per month, housing allowances ranging between US$300 and 
US$2,500. Some executives are also entitled to entertainment allowances as per executive request, although 
others receive flat fees between US$100 and US$1200, one hundred percent medical coverage, fully funded 
pension and some even have daily allowances of US$40 for lunch. Dandira ibid noted that some of these 
companies are struggling to survive and that there is an increasing gap between the poor and the rich with 
workers earning between $90 and $140 per month and companies declaring deadlocks in salary negotiations. 
The same executives were rewarded or paid huge severance packages when they were forced to leave their 
offices due to poor performance or any challenge before the end of their contracts. 
Aduda (2011) noted from other studies that accounting-based contracts reduce non-outcome related noise. The 
writer suggests the use of accounting measures of performance to award directors. Ann Lau and Ed Vos (2004) 
say that authors of a number of empirical studies in The United States of America failed to establish a 
meaningful link between determinants of managerial pay and firm performance. There are no similar studies on 
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the general trend of CEO compensation in relation to corporate performance in Zimbabwe, hence the need for 
the study to close this information gap. 
 
2. Statement of Research Problem and Objectives 
The study sought to find out if there is a positive relationship between directors’ remuneration and corporate 
performance. Are directors’ fees in Zimbabwe consistent with corporate performance as reflected by share price? 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on work by Matowanyika K etal (2013, 62) 
 
4. Research Hypothesis 
Directors’ fees and corporate performance 
H1 - Changes in directors’ fees are not positively related to changes in corporate performance (share price). 
 
5. Theoretical and Empirical Literature Survey 
Directors’ Remuneration and Corporate Performance 
Studies by Doucouliagos et al (2007) indicate that pay is an important mechanism for soliciting effort, rewarding 
productivity and ensuring compliance with owners’ interests. Doucouliagos ibid said that the dearth of 
information on the directors’ pay-performance association in Australia is quite surprising especially given the 
amount of publicity in Australia regarding the remuneration of senior personnel.  
Bender (2007) says that: 
“…pay structures were designed to attract and retain executives with the  
potential of large earnings; to focus their efforts in the direction agreed by 
 the board; and to demonstrate fairness. Importantly, the variable pay  
was seen as a symbol of the director’s success, both internally and to his 
 or her peers in other companies.” (p.01) 
This therefore means that higher pay structures should be linked to bigger and better performing companies.  
Farrer et al (1998) examined if there is a positive relationship between director share ownership and corporate 
performance in Australian companies. The results were to some extent inconclusive but suggested a link between 
director share ownership and corporate performance. Farrer ibid suggests that listed companies encourage their 
directors to increase personal shareholdings. This persuades the directors to be a bit considerate when advocating 
for increased incentives as they will be shareholders as well.  
Jones and Burch (2008) say that in recent years, retention grants have been common and in certain circumstances 
they can be very effective in companies recognising their very top performers and lock them in to the extent 
possible. Retention awards can provide security and help stabilise an organization in the midst of turnaround or a 
major strategic transition. Jones and Burch go on to say that Compensation Committees should not feel pressured 
to provide retention awards broadly just because incentive awards are not paying out, instead, they should take 
the opportunity to explore the underlying reasons for and circumstances surrounding non-payment. Jones and 
Burch say that the Compensation Committees should try to answer the following questions: 
• Has the company underperformed its peers? 
• Is the current management team responsible for these results? 
• Were performance goals set based on realistic assumptions? 
Directors’ 
Remuneration 
 
Firm performance 
• Firm size 
• Directors’ Tenure 
• Directors’ performance 
• Level of competition for Directors 
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• Have there been factors beyond management’s control that have affected results, but management has 
actually taken actions that have minimized potential damage? 
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) found that in an effort to avoid morale and prestige issues, a company may be 
forced to maintain the directors’ incentives at par with equally large companies, leading to some directors’ 
remuneration failing to be aligned to corporate performance. Main (1991) quoted in Gregg (1994) says that the 
principal-agent framework has become a widely used theoretical model to explain the remuneration of high level 
management and chief executives. The study says that according to the typical agency framework shareholders 
delegate decision making authority to managers whose interests potentially diverge from those of the 
shareholders. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) say that the contract offered typically ties the reward received by the 
manager to a variable that the principal is interested in such as company performance or shareholder returns.  
Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) argue that managers are disciplined through the managerial labour market as superior 
performers are suitably rewarded with high wage offers whereas inferior performers receive low offers. Gibbons 
and Murphy (1992) say that the discipline in the managerial labour market assumes that managers improve their 
outside options by effort which is congruent with maximising shareholder wealth. Dogan and Smyth (2002) 
found no association between board remuneration and firm performance in publicly listed Malaysian companies 
whilst Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) established a positive relationship between changes in company 
performance and board remuneration within Spanish listed companies. In Australia, Izan et al (1998) in their 
study used data on a sample of ninety nine Australian firms for the period 1987 to 1992 and found no link 
between CEO pay and performance. Defina et al (1994) used cross-sectional data for eighty nine firms for 1990 
and could not find a pay-performance link. Similar results were found by Evans and Stromback (1994) for the 
1990 - 1991 period, and Fleming and Stellios (2002) for eighty six firms for 1998. 
According to Fraser (2003) the corporate council of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) says that corporate 
entities are required to ensure that the level and composition of executive remuneration is sufficient and 
reasonably linked to performance level of directors. Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) note that the principal-
agent model can be represented as: y= f (e, g); where the firm’s performance, y, is a function of managerial effort 
(e) and a set of variables (g) that are randomly distributed and not under managerial control. The researchers say 
that managers’ compensation should be based on observable outcomes and that contracts should be designed to 
motivate the agents’ best performance so as to result in a positive relationship between the executives’ 
remuneration and firm performance.  
Baker and Hall (2004) quoted in Frydman et al (2010) suggest that the measure of CEO incentives be linked to 
how CEO behaviour affects firm value. Shah et al (2009) echoed the same, saying that firm performance is 
considered to be the significant determination of CEO compensation. Shah et al (2009) suggest that Return on 
Equity (ROE) be used as a measure of firm performance. They argued that profit is a better indicator of CEO 
compensation than sales as indicated by Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) and DeAngelo. H et al (2009). Frydman 
et al (2010) say that the value of equity is the right measure of director incentives as its effect scales with firm 
size. 
Studies by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) and Deckop (1988) quoted in Shah et al (2009) found out that firm 
profitability was positively related to executive compensation and Return on Equity (ROE) was unrelated to 
salary but positively related to bonuses. Miller (1995) complains that:  
“It is disturbing that, in the last 70 years, studies have yielded either no 
 empirical evidence that increases in CEO pay are tied to performance  
or have had significant results but explained less than 10 percent of  
the variance in change in CEO salaries, presumably because of the methods 
 used. At the same time, corporations are adamant in their defence of  
their directors’ remuneration and the notion that salary increases are  
based on firm performance.” (p.1362)  
These controversies result in the lack of reliability and confidence on the various research findings, thereby 
limiting their practical applicability. 
These writers argue that CEO Directors are more willing to award the CEO a higher compensation or are more 
reluctant to challenge the excess level of CEO compensation. They say that outside CEO Directors are more 
willing to reward the CEO for good performance, but less willing to penalise the CEO for poor performance, 
relative to non-CEO outside directors. These studies then expect the presence of outside CEO Directors to 
increase (decrease) the pay-for-performance sensitivity during periods of good (poor) firm performance and 
decrease the pay-for-performance sensitivity during the periods of poor performance. A study by Fich (2005) 
however shows a positive stock price reaction to the appointment of outside CEOs to the board. This means that 
the appointment of outside CEOs will improve the firm’s performance and subsequently the CEO compensation 
is expected to improve. 
Dandira M (2011) says that the earning structure is supposed to be equitable and that there was supposed to be 
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some science that determines the differentials. The researcher sees a need to revamp the directors' contracts so 
that there is equitable pay structure. Conyon (2000) recommended that executives purchase company shares in 
the future at current prices thus giving them every incentive to raise share price. This could be a way of ensuring 
that the CEOs work to improve the company performance. 
Some researchers have come up with proposed ratios of remuneration between the top and the bottom. Plato 
(1991) quoted in Kakabadse et al. (2004) says that the right ratio between the top and bottom is 5:1 while 
Drucker quoted in Wagner (1999) says it should be 20:1. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) say that in 
Continental Europe and Japan the CEO remuneration is fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) times that of the bottom 
worker.  The researcher says that in the USA the gap between executive pay and average pay is continuously 
increasing. Wagner and Minard ibid, supported this when they said that the CEO of AT&T earns four hundred 
(400) times what the lowest-paid employee earns. Dandira ibid says that Africa has the same scenario as USA as 
CEOs in parastatals earn around two hundred times (200) times or more what the lowest employee is paid. 
Dandira M (2011) says that it has become more common for director reward to outstrip company performance in 
terms of shareholder return. This view is supported by Kennedy (2000) who expressed concerns about the £2.8 
million payment to Bob Ayling for quitting as CEO of British Airways in the wake of slump in profits. Kennedy 
(2000) further says that pay of executives in the utilities sector rose one hundred and six percent compared with 
total shareholder return for the year of thirty percent. 
Gregg (1992) says that a lot of theoretical work has stressed the need for a contract in which shareholders are 
able to monitor the performance of top executives and award them pay increases that are concomitant with their 
work effort. Gregg ibid, says that a great deal of United State of America (USA) empirical work has been 
amassed to support a positive but very small relationship between top executive pay and shareholder returns. 
This study sought to investigate if in Zimbabwe there is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
corporate performance.  
 
6. Methodology 
Research designs: The research used a quantitative research design. The design sought to answer the research 
questions pertaining to the research objective by providing quantitative data in the form of numerical findings 
that could be generalized and make use of statistical tests which provide conclusions on the research objective.  
Data collection approaches: Secondary data was collected from the detailed annual reports prepared possibly 
for shareholders of the various companies. These annual reports were very scarce to come by. The information 
on directors’ fees could neither be found in the publicly published financial statements, ZSE Handbook nor from 
internet sources. 
Population and sample: The study population consisted of seventy eight Zimbabwe Stock Exchange listed 
companies. Convenient samples of nine companies in 2009 and thirteen companies in 2010 were drawn. Due to 
the scarcity of data on directors’ remuneration the research only considered companies whose information could 
be accessed. 
Data analysis procedures: Correlation coefficients, Chi square tests regression analysis and averages were used 
for data analysis. 
 
7. Findings and Discussion of the Hypothesis 
The 2009 results reflect a fairly weak positive correlation between directors’ fees and corporate performance 
(share prices) of twenty five comma eight percent, and the 2010 results show a very weak positive correlation of 
six and a half percent. The results show that the positive correlation between directors’ remuneration and 
corporate performance decreased sharply within the two years studied. The results highlight that in 2009 twenty 
five comma eight percent of the directors fees could be explained by the corporate performance. This figure 
dropped to six comma five percent in 2010. 
The results of the 2009 and 2010 simple regression showed the following model results: 
y = 245 599 + 2 114x and 
y = 483 667 + 1 083x respectively. 
From the equations above, US$245 599 of the 2009 directors’ fees could not be explained by fluctuations in 
share prices whereas in 2010 the figure that could not be explained by share price changes rose to US$483 667. 
The amount the directors would get regardless of the changes in share price rose by ninety seven percent 
between 2009 and 2010 when the average share price decreased by six comma nine percent during the same 
period. There was a positive relationship between directors’ fees and corporate performance (share price) in 
2009 as shown by the coefficient of 2 114. This positive relationship weakened by forty nine percent in 2010 as 
shown by a reduced positive coefficient of 1 083. The results show that the rate of increase of directors’ fees as 
share price increases decreased by forty nine percent between 2009 and 2010. As noted from the research results, 
the directors’ fees increased two hundred and fifty five percent regardless of the six comma nine percent fall in 
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average share price. The research noted that some other factors besides movement in share prices could have 
influenced the sharp rise in directors’ fees.  
The null hypothesis which says that changes in directors’ fees are positively related to changes in corporate 
performance (share price) was rejected.  The relationship between directors’ fees and corporate performance (r2) 
was noted to be weak and was even getting weaker. The figure of directors’ fees which is independent of 
changes in corporate performance almost doubled (ninety seven percent) between 2009 (n = 9) and 2010 (n = 
13). The research findings showed that the rate of change of directors’ fees with changes in corporate 
performance dropped by almost forty nine percent between 2009 and 2010. The Chi Square Test results (at 5% 
significance level) however indicated that the differences in the research sample sizes used in the two years 
under review could have influenced the research findings. 
 
8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The research concluded that Directors’ remuneration in Zimbabwean listed companies is not linked to corporate 
performance and that good corporate governance is lacking in most of these companies as suggested by the 
scarcity of information on directors’ remuneration. The researchers recommend that directors’ remuneration 
should be centrally determined and controlled probably by a board like the Institute of Directors of Zimbabwe 
(IODZ). The institute should rank directors’ fees in accordance with agreed measures which may include 
corporate size and performance, directors’ qualifications and success history among other variables. Directors 
should get less fixed fees; much of the directors’ fees should be determined by certain corporate performance 
measures. The ZSE should assist by insisting on the disclosure of the figures of the total and individual directors’ 
fees in the ZSE Handbooks for listed companies. It should also consider delisting companies that do not comply 
and those that do not have a consistent measure or determinant of directors’ fees. The Registrar of Companies 
should consider deregistering companies that do not have a consistent rewarding system for directors. Further 
research on this topic is encouraged. 
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